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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Are Appellants entitled to appeal from the Amended Judgment on 
Special Verdict, with Additur ("Amended Judgment"), where they accepted the 
proposed additur with a reservation of the right to appeal? 
Standard of review: By their nature, the appealability of an order, and 
standing to appeal, are questions of law which the trial court does not decide, and 
which the appellate court decides de novo. 
2. Did the trial court err in awarding an additur of $15,000 to a verdict 
of $17,000, where it made no findings that the jury was motivated by prejudice or 
passion, and there is no evidence of prejudice or passion? 
Standard of review: The trial court's decision to award an additur, or in 
the alternative a new trial, is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Crookston v. 
Fire Insurance Exchange. 817 P.2d 789, 802-05 (Utah 1991); Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23, 26-27 (Utah App. 1991). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following rule is determinative of the issues presented for review: 
Rule 59(a)(5) and (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: 
New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 , a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of 
the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, 
l 
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action 
tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if 
one has been entered, take additional testimony, amend 
findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new 
findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This personal injury action arose out of an intersection collision on January 
30, 1989. Appellee Coral Terry (Terry") alleged that the accident caused personal 
injuries, including a degenerative disc condition, for which she sought special and 
general damages. The trial court granted Terry a directed verdict on the issue of 
the parties' negligence, and submitted the issues of causation and damages to the 
jury. On May 28, 1992, the jury returned a verdict finding Appellants' negligence 
to be the proximate cause of her injuries, and awarded special damages of 
$12,000 and general damages of $5,000. 
On June 2, 1992, Terry moved for an additur in an unspecified amount, or 
a new trial, claiming that the damages awarded were inadequate (the Request for 
Additur is attached hereto as Addendum "A"). In its Ruling on that motion, the 
trial court granted an additur of $15,000, or if Appellants refused the additur, a 
new trial (the Ruling dated July 23, 1992 is attached hereto as Addendum "B"). 
The trial court made no findings that the jury had acted under the influence of 
passion or prejudice, nor did it explain its rationale for the amount of the additur. 
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On August 14, 1992, Defendants appealed from the ruling granting an 
additur, or in the alternative, from the Judgment on Special Verdict of J u n e 12, 
1992. The Utah Supreme Court summarily dismissed that appeal (in Case No. 
920387) in an order dated October 13, 1992, holding that the appeal was 
premature and that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction.! After the case was 
remitted back to the trial court, Appellants filed their Acceptance of Additur on or 
about November 9, 1992 (the Acceptance of Additur is attached as Addendum 
"C"), following which the trial court entered the Amended Judgment, from which 
the present appeal is being taken. The Amended Judgment was signed December 
2, 1992 and entered December 3, 1992, and is attached hereto as Addendum "D.w 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This personal injury case arose out of an intersection collision on January 
30, 1989, involving vehicles driven by Terry and Appellant William Bowles 
("Bowles"), an employee of Appellant U S WEST Communications, Inc. Terry 
claimed various soft t issue injuries, the most significant of which was a 
degenerative disc condition in her cervical spine. 
The trial evidence demonstrated that while Terry had the legal right of way 
at the intersection, Bowies' view of oncoming traffic was partially obstructed (R. 
574-76, 788-789), whereas Terry's view was not obstructed (R. 725, 727). Yet 
1
 The order stated in its entirety as follows: 
Plaintiffs motion for summary dismissal is this day granted. Initially, 
defendants did not respond to the granting of the additur, but objected and appealed 
when plaintiff filed a motion for new trial because defendants had not responded. The 
trial court's ruling, granting defendants until September 23, 1992, to respond was 
proper in reponse [sic] to plaintiffs motion which left the case before th [sic] trial court. 
This appeal is therefore premature, and this court lacks jurisdiction. (R 314) 
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Terry did not even see Bowies' vehicle after it came to a stop at the stop sign 
controlling the intersection (R. 727). Terry's own expert witness conceded on 
cross-examination that Terry may have had sufficient time and capacity to see 
and avoid Bowies' vehicle as it emerged from the intersection (R. 505-07). The 
evidence also showed that the collision occurred at a relatively low speed (under 
10 mph for the Bowles' vehicle (R. 427-29, 579, 786), and approximately 25 mph 
for the Terry vehicle (R. 724-25)), and that the Terry vehicle continued traveling 
forward after the impact, until Terry pulled it over to the curb (R. 708, 727-28).2 
Three days after the accident, Terry first visited Dr. Lyle Jacobs , an 
orthopedic surgeon and her former employer (R. 525-27), who diagnosed a cervical 
strain and prescribed an anti-inflammatory medication and physical therapy (R. 
528). Terry attended nine or ten physical therapy sessions over about four 
months (R. 711, 729), after which she ceased further treatment. During the three 
years following the first visit to Dr. Jacobs, Terry visited him only twice, on April 
12, 1990 (R. 534) and January 24, 1991 (R. 547, 549). Each time Dr. Jacobs 
diagnosed her injury as a cervical strain (Ex. 20), and admitted at trial that that 
was the only diagnosis he had made (R. 548). 
Following the last consultation on January 24, 1991, Dr. Jacobs referred 
Terry for a magnetic resonance imaging test because of her continued complaints 
of pain (R. 536). The MRI revealed slight evidence of a degenerative disc condition 
2
 At the trial, the Court prohibited Appellants* accident reconstruction expert from 
testifying, on the basis of a minute entry in the Court's file regarding designation of witnesses 
(the pre-trial order prepared by Terry's counsel and signed by the Court did not impose any 
deadlines for designation of witnesses). The Court also severely limited the scope of expert 
medical testimony from the only physician called by Appellants (R. 372, 364). See Berrett v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 830 P.2d 291 (Utah App. 1992). 
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(R. 549, 590, 636, 674). According to Dr. Charles Smith, whom Terry called as an 
expert witness, the condition likely predated the accident (R. 650). It was his 
opinion that the accident aggravated the condition and made it symptomatic (R. 
598, 650-51, 656). 
On the issue of special damages, the evidence showed tha t Terry had 
incurred actual medical expenses of about $4,700 (R. 646), of which about $3,000 
represented the cost of a "neurostimulator" obtained about two weeks prior to 
trial, which the prescribing physician acknowledged was experimental (R. 618). 
The remainder of claimed medical special damages was for possible future 
treatment, including a possible future disc fusion surgery (R. 539-40, 608-14). 
The evidence on lost wages showed that Terry had lost no actual wages (R. 688-
89), but took a few compensated sick days shortly after the accident and some 
other time for physical therapy (R. 681, 684-85, Ex. 19). There was some evidence 
that Terry's salary for the fiscal year in which the accident occurred declined by 
about $8,000 because of a decline in her employer's business that year, which her 
employer attributed to lost sales resulting from Terry's injuries (R. 688-89). There 
was no evidence of actual expenditures for household services or other out-of-
pocket losses (R. 743). 
On the issue of general damages, the evidence showed that Terry had 
consulted a physician only three times in the first three years following the 
accident (R. 543), and that the only diagnosis from the treating physician, a board 
certified orthopedic surgeon, was of an ordinary cervical strain (R. 547). The 
suggestion of degenerative disc disease was not made until two years after the 
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accident (R. 536, 539, 549, 669); furthermore, Dr. Smith, who was called by Terry, 
acknowledged that the degenerative disc condition pre-dated the accident (R. 598, 
650, 656), which was consistent with other evidence that Terry had been involved 
in several prior accidents causing injury to the same area of her cervical spine (R. 
537, 753-60).3 The evidence also showed that Terry had attended only nine or ten 
physical therapy sessions (R. 711, 729), and that she had ceased physical therapy 
within about four months after the accident (R. 729). Additionally, with the 
exception of a sample of an anti-inflammatory medicine given to her by Dr. Jacobs 
on her first visit to him (R. 712), the only medication she took for pain was over-
the-counter Tylenol® (R. 731). The evidence of Terry's functional disability (as 
opposed to anatomic impairment, of which there was virtually no objective 
evidence) was purely subjective. 
At the close of evidence, Terry moved for a directed verdict on the issue of 
negligence of both parties, then later withdrew the motion as to her own 
negligence (R. 817). However, at the trial court's urging (R. 823), Terry renewed 
the motion as to her negligence, which the trial court then granted, holding that 
she was not negligent as a matter of law, and that Bowles was negligent as a 
matter of law (R. 823). Having thus removed the issue of comparative negligence 
from the jury, the court then submitted the case to the jury for determination of 
proximate cause and damages. The jury returned a verdict finding that Bowies' 
negligence was the proximate cause of the accident, and awarding total damages 
3 Dr. Wing, a radiologist called by Appellants, agreed that the degenerative disc 
condition pre-dated the accident. (R. 674) 
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of $17,000, consisting of $12,000 for special damages and $5,000 for general 
damages (R. 913-14). 
On June 2, 1992, Terry moved for an additur in an unspecified amount, or 
a new trial, claiming that the damages awarded were inadequate (R. 212). In its 
Ruling on that motion, the trial court granted an additur of $15,000, or if 
Appellants refused the additur, a new trial (R. 259-60). The trial court made no 
findings that the jury had acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, nor 
did it explain its rationale for arriving at the amount of the additur. Rather, the 
court simply stated: 
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs motion for an 
additure [sic] or in the alternative, a new trial. 
The matter of liability was directed by the Court. The issue of 
causation of plaintiffs injury by the defendant was found by the jury 
and an award of $12,000.00 for specials and $5,000.0 [sic] general 
damages was made. 
The foregoing was based on the Court's instructions that on the 
finding of causation the jury was to assess damages for the full 
amount of plaintiffs injuries although the defendants [sic] negligence 
may have aggravated or light [sic] up a latent, dormant , or 
asymptomatic condition. 
In assessing such damages the jury awarded only little more 
than half the medical and other special damages testified to by the 
only witnesses on this point called by the plaintiff. 
The jurors [sic] assessment of general damages did not take into 
account the pain and suffering of plaintiff to date, nor tha t 
attributable to the surgery, as testified to by Dr. Smith. 
Based on the foregoing considerations the Court grants the 
plaintiffs motion and directs that the sum of $15,000.00 be added to 
the judgment or if defendant refuses such additure [sic], the Court 
grants a new trial of this matter. 
Following dismissal of their appeal from the above ruling (on grounds the 
appeal was premature), Appellants filed an Acceptance of Additur in whi* they 
stated their intention that the acceptance was solely for the purpose of obtaining 
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appellate review of the additur, and which expressly reserved the right to appeal 
from the Amended Judgment in the following language: 
Defendants William C. Bowles and U S WEST Communications, 
Inc. hereby accept the conditional additur ordered by the Court in its 
Ruling dated July 23, 1992, but reserve their right to appeal from the 
amended judgment that will be entered incorporating and reflecting 
such additur, and do not intend hereby to waive any such right of 
appeal. 
This election is made as a result of the order of the Utah 
Supreme Court dated October 13, 1992, which summarily dismissed 
Defendants' appeal from the original judgment on the grounds that 
the appeal was premature and that the Supreme Court therefore 
lacked jurisdiction. That ruling implied tha t the only means of 
obtaining appellate review of the order granting an additur is for 
Defendants to make an election between a new trial and an additur. 
Based on the Supreme Court's statement in State v. General Oil Co.. 
22 Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968) ("We need not determine 
whether or not the court's ruling [granting] an additur was erroneous 
inasmuch as that issue has now become moot by the trial de novo/), 
Defendants believe that the Supreme Court might refuse to review the 
additur if Defendants elected a new trial; therefore, it appears that the 
only other alternative means of obtaining appellate review is by 
electing an additur and appealing from the amended judgment. 
(R. 325-26) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. Appellants are entitled to appeal from the Amended Judgment which 
incorporated the additur ordered by the trial court, even though they accepted the 
additur, reserving the right to appeal, in order to obtain appellate review of the 
additur. The Amended Judgment is a final, appealable order. Under applicable 
Utah law, Appellants could not obtain appellate review of the additur if they had 
elected a new trial, since a new trial would have mooted the additur issue. Hence 
the only means to obtain appellate review of the additur was by accepting the 
additur with a reservation of the right to appeal. Appellants did not waive their 
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right to appeal, nor are they estopped from appealing, since Terry did not rely to 
her detriment on any actions of Appellants, and justice requires that Appellants 
have an avenue to obtain appellate review of the trial court's additur order that 
quadrupled the general damages awarded by the jury. 
2. The jury verdict in this case, which awarded Appellee both special 
($12,000) and general ($5,000) damages for her claimed soft tissue injuries, was 
fully justified by the evidence, including evidence that her primary treating 
physician diagnosed nothing more than a cervical strain resulting from the 
accident (R. 548, Ex. 20), that she only sought treatment from a physician three 
times in the first three years following the accident (R. 543), and that she took no 
pain medication other than non-prescription Tylenol® (R. 731). Thus the jury 
verdict was not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence, nor 
passion or prejudice. Indeed, the trial court made no findings that the jury verdict 
was the product of passion or prejudice. Absent such findings, the trial court is 
not permitted to grant an additur. Therefore, the trial court abused its discretion 
in ordering an additur. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANTS MAY APPEAL FROM THE AMENDED JUDGMENT. 
In her motion for summary affirmance, Terry raised the issue whether 
Appellants are entitled to appeal from the Amended Judgment, where they 
accepted the additur. The Utah Supreme Court denied that motion, but deferred 
ruling on the issues raised by it until plenary presentation of the case. 
Curiously, Terry suggested that a party who elects to accept an additur 
instead of a new trial benefits from the election. That is not necessarily so. 
Election of an additur or remittitur generally means that the electing party merely 
prefers the certainty of an amended judgment to the uncertainty and additional 
expense of a new trial. Actually, it was Terry who benefitted from the $15,000 
additur in this case, not Appellants. However, in this case it is irrelevant whether 
Appellants would benefit from their election, since the election was made not to 
avoid a new trial, but to enable them to obtain appellate review of the additur. 
More importantly, an appeal from the Amended Judgment is the only means 
available to obtain appellate review of the granting of the additur. 
A. If Appellants were not permitted to appeal from the Amended 
Judgment that incorporated an additur, they would have no 
means of obtaining appellate review of the additur. 
No Utah case establishes a rule of law that prohibits a party from appealing 
from an amended judgment which incorporates an additur accepted by that party 
with reservation of the right to appeal. Appellate courts in other jurisdictions 
frequently entertain appeals from trial courts' grants of additur without requiring 
litigants to endure the time, trouble, and expense of an alternative new trial. See 
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r a.9 Sears. Roebuck & Co. v. Moten. 558 P.2d 954 (Ariz. App. 1976) (On appeal, 
appellate court entertained appeal from trial court's grant of additur and vacated 
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 Furthermore, implicit in the fact that appellate courts entertain appeals from grants 
of additur is the notion that grants of additur are indeed appealable orders. For appellate 
courts which have considered appeals from a grant of additur in addition to those cited in the 
discussion accompanying this footnote, see, e.g., Thomas v. Seav. 369 S.E.2d 680 (S.C. App. 
1988) (Appellate court entertained additur and held, inter alia, that defendant did not waive 
right to new trial by appealing order for new trial nisi additur); Foster v. Amcon Intern.. Inc.. 
621 S.W.2d 142 (Term. 1981) (Intermediate appellate court entertained appeal from trial court's 
grant of additur and State Supreme Court considered subsequent appeal on additur issue); 
Jacobsen v. Manfredi by Manfredi. 679 P.2d 251 (Nev. 1984) (Appellate court considered appeal 
from trial court's grant of additur); Bullard v. Grisham Const. Co.. 660 P.2d 1045 (Okla. 1983) 
(Intermediate appellate court and State Supreme Court considered appeals from grant and 
affirmance of additur, respectively, which grant of additur was characterized as an alteration of 
award). 
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an additur would become moot. See State v. General Oil Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 
P.2d 718, 719 (1968) ("We need not determine whether or not the court's ruling 
[granting] an additur was erroneous inasmuch as that issue has now become 
moot by the trial de novo.") Thus the only means of challenging the trial court's 
granting of an additur is to appeal the amended judgment incorporating it. 
Furthermore, judicial economy suggests that an additur be appealable without 
having to endure a new trial, since the duplication of time, expense, and effort in 
conducting a new trial would be utterly wasted if it were later determined that the 
court had erred in granting an additur. In the present case, Terry would be 
satisfied with the Amended Judgment, whereas Appellants would be satisfied with 
the original judgment. Hence neither side wants to endure the risks and costs of 
a new trial, and neither should be forced to do so jus t to determine the validity of 
the additur. 
The Rules of Appellate Procedure support the conclusion that an amended 
judgment incorporating an additur is appealable. Rule 3 permits appeal "from all 
final orders and judgments, except as otherwise provided by law." Rule 4, which 
concerns the time for appeal, provides in subsection (b): 
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in 
the trial court by any party . . . 
(3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or 
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, 
the time for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the order 
denying a new trial or granting or denying any other such motion. 
(emphasis added). Note that the rule distinguishes between Rule 59 motions to 
alter or amend a judgment and Rule 59 motions for a new trial. Clearly a motion 
for an additur is a motion to alter or amend the judgment, and the granting of 
12 
such a motion has the effect of altering the judgment. Hence the granting of an 
additur is distinct from the granting of a new trial only, which is not covered under 
the rule (the rule only mentions denial of a new trial as extending the time to 
appeal lh if lu 'n had asktil u.ul\ d i n 1 ,il, nl il lh< < uhi I l> ul pan ted 
only a new trial, there may not have been a right of appeal. However, in this case 
Teirv rn iurs lu l in literal mm nl illlii |i 11 li'inrnl and tin MUM I |ilUiiiK jii'i atilnl ill 
alteration of the judgment, which is clearly appealable. 
B* Appellants did not waive their right to appeal. 
Terry has asserted that by electing an additur, Appellants waived their right 
to appeal from the amended judgment. That assertion totally ignores the explicit 
language in Appellants* acceptance of additur that reserved the right to appeal. 
Waiver is the voluntary relinquishment or a known right See Black's Law 
11 ) i n I i u i I U i ,' I I II :i (5tl : e • ::i 1 9 3 Appella i its w a ived their right ill: : » 
appeal is wholly inconsistent with what Appellants actually did, namely expressly 
reserve their right to appeal 
In Robison v. Garnett. 238 So.2d 58 (La. App. 1970), the court permitted a 
plaintiff to appeal from a JIKI/'IIHMH dial included a irimttihu dial plaiiil 
accepted under protest and with reservation of his right to appeal. The court 
denied defendants' motion to dismiss the appeal, stating: 
We . . . hold that the restrictive acceptance of the remittitur with full 
reservation to appeal . . . is not such an acquiescence in a judgment 
that would preclude an appeal . . . . 
238 So,2 : 1 i it ; 59. Se t • also, Busch v. Busch Construction. Inc.. 2132 l\l W.J,d A\ 7 
400-01 (Minn 1977), in which the court permitted an appeal by plaintiffs even 
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though plaintiffs had accepted remittiturs. The principle followed in these cases 
applies equally in cases involving additur. 
C. Appellants should not be estopped from appealing. 
Estoppel is an equitable doctrine. It should not be employed to prevent a 
party from obtaining justice. In the circumstances of this case, the only means by 
which Appellants can obtain appellate review of the granting of an additur is by 
electing the additur with a reservation of the right to appeal, then appealing the 
amended judgment that incorporates the additur. In Sequoia Manufacturing Co. 
v. Halec Construction Co.. 117 Ariz. 11, 570 P.2d 782 (Ariz. App. 1977), the court 
stated: 
[E]ach case involving an additur or remittitur must stand or fall on its 
own peculiar set of facts: 
". . . . [T]he ultimate test will always be justice, and any 
case before us which shows an unjust result because of 
the granting or denial or either additur or remittitur, will 
be reversed." 
570 P.2d at 196, quoting Creamer v. Troiano. 108 Ariz. 573, 503 P.2d 794 (1972) 
(emphasis added in Sequoia).5 This Court should take a similar approach. 
Furthermore, an essential element of estoppel is that the adverse party, in 
reasonable reliance on the conduct of the party being estopped, mus t make a 
substantial change in position to her detriment. See, e.g., Baggs v. Anderson. 528 
P. 2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) ("An essential requirement [of estoppel] is that there 
mus t be some conduct of the [party being estopped] . . . which reasonably 
5 In Creamer, whose facts are very similar to the case at bar, the Arizona Supreme 
Court reversed the award of an additur, and reinstated the jury verdict, where the trial court 
had directed a verdict against defendants on the issue of liability, then imposed an additur to 
the damages awarded by the jury. The court held that the trial court had violated the 
defendant's right to a trial by jury. 
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induces flu [party asserting estoppel] . . . to rely thereon and make some 
substantial change in his position to his detriment I ei iy has not shown any 
detrimental reliance or adverse change in her position as a result of Appellants' 
appeal. 
Terry has asserted that the alternatives mentioned in Haslam v. Paulsen. 
"ISM 1 "'mil Hi HHafi I'lMI huh ,nr nvdilnhlc In .1 p.nlv u'hrn ,i new (11
 r in 11 11 in 11 \ in1 
granted (Haslam did not involve a question of additur or remittitur), are the only 
means by which Appellants < nuhl nhl.mi in/iew <tf llir additur. Those alternatives, 
as stated in Haslam, are: (1) an interlocutory appeal or (2) preservation of the 
claim for review upon the final outcome of the case. As to the first alternative, the 
fact is that Appellants' first appeal was deemed by the Supreme Court to be an 
interlocutory appeal, which was dismissed as premature; therefore, interlocutory 
appeal was not a viable option in this case t Is to the second alternai 
possible to preserve a claim as to the granting of an additur while at the same 
tii i I ;:!: electii lg a i iei * ti iai sii ice a i I-* . • r State v. 
General Oil Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968) ("We need not 
determ ii le IA 1 lethei : •] i I : t tl i s coi t.i t s i i Uing [granting] an,, nddil in w is iTRinn m i 1 , 
inasmuch as that issue has now become moot by the trial de novo.") Thus the 
only avenue left to Appellants to obtain review of the erroneous granting of an 
additur is through the present appeal. 
In summary, as a result of the dismissal of Appellants* first appeal and the 
trial court's order that Appellants must choose between additur and a new trial, 
Appellants were left with only two choices: elect a new trial, in which event the 
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additur issue would have become moot; or elect the additur with reservation of the 
right to appeal. Having chosen the latter course—the only course available to 
obtain appellate review of the erroneous granting of the additur—Appellants 
should not now be denied that review. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING AN 
ADDITUR. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not discuss additur or remittitur. 
However, Rule 59(a) sets forth the grounds upon which a new trial may be 
granted. Those grounds include "excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," and "insufficiency of 
the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, or that it is against law," 
which are the two grounds upon which Terry based her motion for an additur, or 
in the alternative a new trial. 
The trial court did not articulate which of the two asserted grounds it relied 
on to grant the additur. In its Ruling, the trial court merely observed that "the 
jury awarded only little more than half the medical and other special damages 
testified to by the only witnesses on this point called by the plaintiff," and that 
"[t]he jurors [sic] assessment of general damages did not take into account the 
pain and suffering of plaintiff to date, nor that attributable to the surgery, as 
testified to by Dr. Smith." (R. 259-60)6 The trial court did not explain what it 
thought the $5,000 in general damages awarded by the jury represented, if not 
pain and suffering. In any event, the trial court made no finding that the jury 
6
 Presumably the court was referring to a possible future disc fusion surgery, since 
Terry had not had any surgery prior to trial. 
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acted under the influence of passion or prejudice, nor that the evidence was 
insufficient to justify the jury's verdict, nor that the verdict was "against law." 
A. Because the determination of damages is the province of the 
jury, the trial court may not award an additur in the absence of 
findings that the jury acted under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
It is \\; ell established that the amount of damages to be awarded in a 
personal injury action is presumptively the province of the jury, and that one 
challenging the jury's determination of damages bears a heavy burden of showing 
that the damages awarded were outside the range of the evidence, or that the jury 
Equally importantly, the trial court made no such finding. 
The well-accepted .1 1 (I .Intnl f?ritt!r;il iuli 1 » (lint 'the 1 1 nil mil 
great latitude in assessing damages for personal injuries." Pauly v. McCarthy. 184 
P.2d 123 (Utah 1947); see also Hilliei v. Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300 305 (I Jt .a h 1 \ pp. 
1987). 
Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for the 
jury and unless such an award clearly indicates the jury's disregard of 
competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice, the trial 
court may not interfere with the jury's determination. 
Battv v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Utah 1978); see also, Paul v. KirkendalL 1 
Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Weber Water Basin Conservancy District v. 
Skeen. 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958J.7 
In Campbell v. Safeway Stores. Inc.. 15 Utah 2d 113, 388 P.2d 409 (1964), 
7
 A corollary principle is that "it is the exclusive prerogative of the jury to judge the 
credibility of the witnesses and to find the facts." Williams v. Llovd. 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 
166, 167 (1965). See also, Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. 667 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah 1983). 
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the Court refused to find that an award of $14,053.26 for a fractured femur 
resulting in permanent impairment was so inadequate as to justify an additur, 
even though the plaintiff had sustained approximately $8,000 in medical 
expenses. The Court stated: 
Due to their advantaged position in close proximity to the trial, the 
parties and the witnesses; and their practical knowledge of the affairs 
of life as a background against which to weigh the evidence, the 
assessment of damages is something peculiarly within the prerogative 
of the jury to determine, and the court is extremely reluctant to 
interfere with their judgment in that regard. 
Under our system it is contemplated that the right to trial by 
jury be assured. This is something more than a high-sounding 
phrase to be declaimed on patriotic occasions. It is the duty of courts 
to honor it in the observance. Whenever there is genuine dispute as 
to issues of fact upon which the parties' rights depend, they are 
entitled to have them submitted to and settled by a jury. When the 
parties have had a full and fair opportunity to present their cause, 
and the jury has rendered its verdict, it should not be interfered with 
unless there appears some compelling reason why justice demands 
that it be done. 
388 P.2d at 411-12. 
A court will defer to a jury's verdict unless it is so excessive or inadequate 
"as to be shocking to one's conscience and to clearly indicate passion, prejudice or 
corruption on the part of the jury." McAffee v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co.. 62 
Utah 115, 129, 218 P. 98, 104 (1923); see also Hillier v. Lamborn. 740 P.2d 300, 
305 (Utah App. 1987). Furthermore, in the absence of court findings indicating 
that the jury was actuated by improper motive, prejudice, or bias in arriving at its 
verdict such that would compel a finding that reasonable men and women would 
of necessity come to a different conclusion, the trial court cannot substitute its 
judgment for that of the fact finder. See Jensen v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 
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1978); see also, Dupuis v. Nelson. 624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981) (When damage award 
is not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the evidence by the jury, a court 
is not empowered to entertain a motion for additur.); Mever v. Bartholomew. 690 
, Onveabor v. Pro Roofing. Inc. 'M,1' "" i1! M!!"? H'l.-ili ,'\pp. 
1990). 
B. award of special damage inadeqi iii te . 
In the Amended Judgment, the trial court did not increase the amount of 
special damages at all; the entire additur was appended to the award of general 
damages. The implication of this action is that despite the tr ial court 's 
observation that "the jury awarded only little more than half the medical and other 
damages testified to by the only witnesses on this point called by the Plaintiff," the 
court did not intend that any part of the additur should represent an increase in 
special damages. I Jul lining llir < asu (In nc is in Inilli i muni i I I! discuss whether 
the award of special damages was adequate. 
A s ; »ir i , el 
ordered an additur to the special damages, there would be no basis 1or a 
conclusion that the amount awarded by thr jury l/fl" ' »0P) v ,n lnadrqint" Y\\v 
evidence showed that Terry had incurred actual medical expenses of about $1,700 
in the more than three years prior to the month before trial (R. 646); that two 
weeks prior to the trial . otained the use of an experimental 
"neurostimulator" at a cost of about $3,000 (R. 646); and that her wages had 
tlioppnl h\ ,ih il $h,i KM i I llir 11seal yea] oil her business in which the accident 
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occurred (R. 688-89).8 The sum of those three items, which were the only out of 
pocket losses on which Terry presented evidence, is approximately $12,700—only 
$700 different from the actual jury award. 
The remainder of Terry's claimed special damages related to projections of 
future expenses relating to a disc fusion surgery, including the costs of the 
surgery itself, the cost of future household expenses, lost wages during 
recuperation, etc. (Ex. 14). The jury may have concluded, and probably did, that 
the surgery was not reasonably certain or probable to occurs or that it was 
sufficiently speculative,10 that no award of special damages for its consequences 
was justified. The mere fact that Terry's witnesses testified to such possible future 
expenses does not compel the jury to award them, even when there was no 
evidence to the contrary. The fact remains that Terry bore the burden of 
persuasion on the issue of special damages. Since her evidence of future 
expenses did not persuade the jury, she should not be permitted to cure that 
failure by resorting to the trial judge in a motion for an additur. 
8
 Terry also claimed about $1,800 lost wages for the time she took compensated sick 
leave following the accident, but conceded that she did not actually lose those wages, only that 
she had to use her sick leave. (R. 685, Ex. 19) 
9
 The trial court instructed the jury that it may consider "whether any of the [elements 
of damages] will with reasonable certainty continue in the future, and if you so find, award 
such damages as will fairly and justly compensate the plaintiff for the m." R. 836. 
The evidence that the surgery was reasonably certain to occur was suspect, since Dr. 
Smith, the physician who would perform the surgery, acknowledged that Terry had never 
requested the surgery, and testified that he would not perform that type of surgery unless the 
patient requested it. (R. 641-42, 776) Terry herself was equivocal about when she had decided 
to have the surgery, and the jury could reasonably have concluded that she testified she had 
decided to have the surgery only for the beneficial effect that such testimony might have at 
trial, rather than being a preponderance of the evidence that the surgery would occur with 
reasonable certainty. (R. 775-78, 721-22) 
10
 The jury was instructed not to award speculative damages. R. 839. 
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Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61 [harmless error], a new trial 
may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the 
issues, for any of the following causes: . . . 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been 
given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision, or that it is against law. . . . 
(emphasis added) 
It cannot be said in this case that the damages were awarded under the 
influence of passion or prejudice, since the jury made a generous award of special 
damages that virtually covered all *e medical expenses Terry had actually 
incurred to the date of trial, including the experimental "neurostimulator," (ca. 
obligated to award more in special damages, jus t because Terry's counsel pleaded 
for it. 11 
C. The award of general damages is not inadequate. 
It is well established that "[wjhere personal injuries involve >f 
employment, personal inconvenience, and pain and suffering, there is no set 
formula to compute the amount of damages." Cruz v. Montoya. 660 P.2d 723, 726 
(Utah 1983); see also. Jorgensen v. Gonzales. 1 1 lll.ih lid ;U0, JHJ I'.Ud 1KJ4 
(1963). However, by awarding a $15,000 additur, the trial court quadrupled the 
11 For example, Terry's counsel asked for loss of income damages for the time she spent 
on sick leave, even though it was admitted that she lost no wages as a result of taking sick 
leave. Her claim for loss of income in the future is sheer speculation. Her attorney also asked 
for damages for household expenses, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that Terry's 
husband had taken care of the household chores that Terry couldn't do for three years, with no 
actual cost to Terry. (R. 743, 767) 
21 
amount awarded by the jury for general damages (from $5,000 to $20,000), 
without providing any rationale for the amount of the additur. 
The award of general damages for pain and suffering, the proof of which is 
uniquely dependent on the credibility of the plaintiff, is clearly and exclusively 
within the province of the jury to determine. See Batty v. Mitchell. 575 P.2d 1040, 
1043 (Utah 1978) ("Generally, the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for 
the jury and unless such an award clearly indicates the jury 's disregard of 
competent evidence or the influence of passion or prejudice, the trial court may 
not interfere with the jury's determination.")^ 
The jury 's award for general damages was well within the scope of the 
evidence. It is apparent that the jury did not accord Terry's testimony of pain and 
suffering, nor of her disability, much weight, nor was it obligated to do so. The 
jury was not obligated to believe Terry's evidence on those issues, which was 
supported only by her own subjective, obviously biased descriptions and those of 
her obviously biased husband and employer, is There was precious little if any 
objective medical evidence that would compel a finding of severe, chronic pain and 
suffering. The expert physicians testified that the degenerative disc disease which 
she had prior to the accident had changed only slightly from the time of the 
12 Citing Paul v. Klrkendall. 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953); Weber Water Basin 
Conservancy Dist. v. Skeen. 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
13
 On the issue of disability, Terry's own witness admitted that the "disability" was 
primarily "functional/ meaning that it related not to observable anatomic damage, but rather 
was dependent on her subjective reports of inability to perform tasks, as well as her 
subjective reports of pain upon being asked to perform certain range of motion tests (R 637-
38). Thus Terry's evidence of disability, as well as of pain and suffering, depended on her own 
credibility. The jury was entitled to find her testimony not credible, and award damages 
accordingly, whether or not there was contrary evidence. 
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accident to the time of the MRI two years later (R. 636, 674). 
The jury undoubtedly took into account the undisputed facts that Terry only 
sought medical attention for her injuries three times in the three years following 
the accident; tha t she took no medication stronger than over-the-counter 
Tylenol®; that with the exception of a few days in 1989, she continued to work at 
the same job she held prior to the accident; and that no diagnosis of degenerative 
disc disease was made until two years after the accident. Thus there is ample 
evidence to sustain a finding by the jury that Terry's pain and suffering was not as 
dramatic or severe or prolonged as claimed. Simply put, the ju iy did not have 
to believe Coral Terry. The jury c^nvd have concluded that her testimony of pain 
and suffering was simply a natur if-serving exaggeration by a biased party. 
Nor was the jury bound tc . higher general damages because of anything 
said by Defendants' counsel in argument. The jury was properly instructed that 
arguments of counsel are not evidence (R. 835), and Defendants' counsel never 
stipulated to any amount as a minimum for general damages. Terry's counsel had 
two opportunities in his closing argument (opening and rebuttal) to persuade the 
jury to award a substantial amount for general damages; the fact that his 
argument was ineffective to convince the jury is no ground to grant an additur or 
a new trial. 
Cases from both Utah and other jurisdictions*4 support the conclusion that 
14
 Some cases from other jurisdictions that have sustained damages of $5,000 or less in 
back or neck injury cases are as follows: 
$5,000 was adequate damages where woman sprained neck and suffered from sporadic 
back pain for at least one year after accident; ruptured disc discovered months after accident. 
Malbrouffh v. Pascal. 394 So.2d 815 (La. App. 1981) 
$5,000 was adequate damages where man experienced neck and upper back pain 
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the jury's award of $5,000 general damages, in addition to its award of $12,000 
for special damages, is adequate under the circumstances. In Jensen v. Eakins. 
575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978), the Utah Supreme Court refused to grant an additur 
where the jury awarded the plaintiff $8,201.03 total damages, consisting of 
$4,239.63 medical expenses and $3,961.40 general damages for unspecified 
injuries arising out of an automobile collision in which the plaintiffs wife was 
killed. The Court stated: 
The award of damages may be less than the plaintiff wished or even 
less than we would have found had we been the jury; but it is the 
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages and we 
cannot substitute our judgment for that of the fact finder unless 
the evidence compels a finding that reasonable men and women 
would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion. The evidence 
in this case was not such as would indicate tha t the jury was 
actuated by any improper motive, prejudice, or bias in arriving at its 
verdict. The plaintiff had a fair trial and that is all he is entitled to. 
indicative of cervical sprain, was diagnosed with occipital neuralgia, and testified that he 
suffered debilitating headaches five to six times per week to the date of trial. Leleux v. Home 
Indem. Co.. 457 So.2d 300 (La. App. 1984) 
$5,000 was adequate damages where woman as a result of auto accident received two 
lacerations on her scalp, neck injury which left neck severely restricted, injuries to back, 
strains of cervical and lumbar regions, and a fractured rib. Clements v. Continental Insurance 
Co.. 277 So.2d 714 (La. App. 1973). 
$5,000 was adequate damages where accident victim experienced neck strain, ringing 
in ears, and pain in neck, which subsided one month after auto accident. McGowan v. Farris. 
384 So.2d 544 (La. App. 1980). 
$4,500 was adequate damages for auto accident injuries including moderately severe 
neck strain, strain of posterior area of chest, strain of lumbosacral area, which gradually 
subsided without residual side effects. Joseph v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co.. 271 So.2d 
714 (La. App. 1972). 
$4,000 was adequate damages for cervical and lumbar strain received in auto accident. 
Potts v. Hollier. 344 So.2d 70 (La. App. 1977). 
$4,000 was adequate damages for moderately severe cervical strain received in auto 
accident that aggravated pre-existing arthritis. Dobard v. Becnel. 345 So.2d 147 (La. App. 
1977). 
$3,000 was adequate damages for pain and suffering, cervical strain, contusions of 
musculature of right flank received in auto accident. Bovles v. Bridgeman. 342 So.2d 1150 
(La. App. 1977). 
$3,000 was adequate damages for neck injuries received in rear-end collision requiring 
medication and use of cervical collar, and causing continued discomfort and stiffness two years 
after injury, no residual disability. Bankston v. Cooper. 371 So.2d 654 (La. App. 1979). 
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575 P.2d at 180 (emphasis added). 
In Mever v. Bartholomew. 690 P.2d 558 (Utah 1984), the Utah Supreme 
Court refused to grant an additur to a $23,000 verdict for a serious eye injury 
requiring multiple surgeries, leaving the victim with only 75% normal rotational 
use of the affected eye. In denying the request for additur, the Court discussed 
Bodon v. Suhrmann. 8 Utah 2d 42, 327 P.2d 826 (1958), the first Utah case 
recognizing additur in a personal injury context (in which case the Court added 
$400 to a $100 judgment). The Court in Mever stated: 
There is no reasonable basis for relativity of the two sums in that and 
this case to show adequacy or inadequacy of damages "appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice," under 
Rule 59. 
Shortly after the Bodon case, we had occasion again to entertain 
the question of "inadequacy of damages" under the Rule.*5 In 
language that is dispositive of the instant case, we said: 
Although the evidence introduced could have justified a 
larger verdict than granted, the evidence . . . was not so 
certain that the amount granted is so inadequate as to 
make it appear that it [the verdict] was given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice . . . . Under such a state 
of facts we do not interfere with the judgment of the jury. 
Bodon v. Suhrmann, . . . cited by appellant has not 
changed the reasons upon which this court will change 
an award of damages by a jury. 
In a case with facts remarkably similar to the one at bar, Dupuis v. Nielson. 
624 P.2d 685 (Utah 1981), the Court similarly refused to grant an additur or new 
trial. In Dupuis . involving a rear-end accident, the Court granted the plaintiff a 
15 Citing Sprunt v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad. 9 Utah 2d 142, 340 P.2d 85 
(1959); Jensen v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179 (Utah 1978). 
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directed verdict on liability (as in this case). Notwithstanding evidence that the 
plaintiff had to leave her former work because of the injury, and that she suffered 
"continual headaches, pain when bending her neck, and pain in performing 
simple tasks such as opening jars and dressing herself {id. at 686), the jury 
returned a verdict for $1,000 in general damages (plus special damages). The 
Court stated: 
[W]hen the damages are not so inadequate as to Indicate a disregard 
of the evidence by the jury, a court is not empowered to entertain a 
motion for an additur. . . . Plaintiffs contention that the award of 
damages is inadequate in light of the evidence is without merit. The 
evidence does not compel a finding that reasonable persons would 
have reached a different measure of damages. 
624 P.2d at 686. 
The most recent Utah case addressing the issue of inadequacy of damages 
in a personal injury case, which is also factually similar to the case at bar, most 
dramatically demonstrates why it was improper to grant an additur. In Onyeabor 
v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990), the plaintiff was injured in 
an intersection collision. The two drivers' vision of each other was obstructed, 
although the plaintiff (unlike Terry in this case) did see and try to avoid the 
defendant's vehicle. The collision caused minor damage to the two vehicles. The 
plaintiff claimed a herniated lumbar disc and "closed-head brain injury and /or 
post-traumatic syndrome." {id. at 526) The plaintiff alleged damage in excess of 
$1,100,000, and also claimed that he was "permanently and totally disabled from 
future meaningful employment." {id.) After an extensive trial, the jury awarded 
total damages of $16,850 (similar to the $17,000 awarded by the jury in this 
case). The Court observed that "[t]he jury's verdict obviously reflects the fact that 
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they believed Plaintiffs evidence of a back injury, but either did not believe that 
there was a head injury or that it was not caused by the accident." (id. at 530) 
The Court also concluded that the amounts awarded "appear to be reasonable, 
particularly in view of other evidence that plaintiff may have had a preexisting 
back condition which was aggravated by the accident and an incident in a 'karate 
class/" Id.™ 
The Court in Onyeabor also observed, with respect to the question of 
causation of the alleged brain injury, that "[t]his hotly disputed question of fact 
was for the jury, whose exclusive province it is to weigh the evidence and 
determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . Thus, plaintiff simply failed to convince 
the jury of his entire case." Id. 
The Court's comments in Onyeabor are equally applicable in this case. 
Whether the trial court or this Court would have awarded a larger amount is 
beside the point. The jury did its duty, the verdict is consistent with the evidence 
it chose to believe, there is no evidence that it acted out of prejudice or passion, 
and the plain fact is that Terry and her attorney failed to sustain their burden of 
persuasion to justify a higher damage award. There is no basis for an additur or 
a new trial for Terry. 
D. The trial court abused its discretion in awarding an additur. 
Under Utah law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the tribunal's decision 
is "beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 239-40 
*
6
 Note that this case was decided subsequent to Biswell v. Duncan. 742 P.2d 80 (Utah 
1987), on which Terry relies. Thus Biswell does not stand for the proposition that substantial 
damages must be awarded for a pre-existing condition that is aggravated by a subsequent 
accident. 
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(Utah 1992); Barnard v. Sutliff. 202 Utah Adv. Rep. 17, 20 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. O'NeiL 1993 WL 41765 n. 5 (Utah App., filed Feb. 12, 1993). In Tolman 
v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991), this Court more fully 
articulated the meaning of "abuse of discretion/ It stated: 
Discretion . . . "is limited in that it must be exercised within the 
confines of the legal s tandards set by appellate courts . . . . " . . . 
Discretion may best be viewed as an arena bounded by the law, 
within which the tribunal may exercise its judgment as it sees fit. 
By an "abuse of discretion" . . . "is meant a clearly 
erroneous conclusion and judgment . . . . It does not 
imply intentional wrong or bad faith or misconduct, nor 
any reflection on the judge. It is a legal term to indicate 
that the appellate court is of the opinion that there was 
commission of error of law in the circumstances. It is an 
improvident exercise of discretion; an error of law. 
. . . . Obviously, the making of a clearly erroneous factual finding is 
an abuse of discretion, as is acting unreasonably or misinterpreting 
the law. In essence, a reviewing court never overturns a lower 
tribunal unless there has been an abuse of discretion. 
818 P.2d at 26-27 (citations omitted) 
In the present case, the trial court abused its discretion, as that term is 
defined above, by infringing on the jury's prerogative to determine damages, 
because it awarded an additur without determining that the jury had acted under 
the influence of passion or prejudice. Even if the court's ruling granting the 
additur could be construed to imply a finding of passion or prejudice, it would 
still be an abuse of discretion, because there is no evidence that the jury acted 
improperly in any way. The jury had every right to determine which special 
damages had been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and to award 
general damages of $5,000 on evidence that Terry had not required medical 
treatment except on three occasions in three years, that her treating physician 
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diagnosed nothing more than a cervical strain, and that she could control her 
pain through the use of over-the-counter Tylenol®. 
Whereas the law permitted the trial court to award an additur only upon 
evidence that "compels a finding that reasonable men and women would, of 
necessity"w award a different amount of damages, the trial court nonetheless 
overrode the jury's prerogative without any finding of prejudice or passion, nor 
that the jury's verdict was not supported by the evidence, nor that it was against 
law. Thus, in granting an additur under these circumstances, the trial court went 
"beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 
1992). That constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The only prejudice in this case was exhibited by the trial court, which 
excluded key defense witnesses, severely restricted the testimony of the only 
medical expert the defense was permitted to call, then removed the issue of 
comparative negligence from the jury, despite Terry's own testimony that she took 
her eyes off the other vehicle after it came to a stop and never saw it thereafter 
unti l the collision, and despite the test imony of Terry's own accident 
reconstruction expert, who testified that Terry had adequate time and ability to 
avoid the accident. 
The jury, to its credit, saw the weakness in Terry's damage case, concluded 
that most of the claimed special damages were speculative, and that Terry's 
claimed pain and suffering were more ephemeral than substantial, and awarded 
17 Jensen v. Eakins. 575 P.2d 179, 180 (Utah 1978) (emphasis added). 
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damages accordingly, as it was legally entitled to do. Terry had plainly failed to 
carry her burden of proof of damages in a higher amount. 
The trial court, adding insult to injury, then usurped the jury's findings on 
damages, and awarded an additur that quadrupled the general damages, without 
the required finding (much less any evidence) tha t the ju ry was under the 
influence of passion or prejudice, nor that there was any misconduct on the part 
of the jury. In doing so, the trial court plainly abused its discretion. Appellants 
are entitled to have the original jury verdict reinstated, and therefore request this 
Court to reverse the Amended Judgment on Special Verdict, with Additur, and to 
order reinstatement of the original judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this 2nd day of March, 1993. 
U S WEST Communications, Inc. 
By 
Floyd A. Jensen, Attorney 
Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of March, 1993, I caused two copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Appellants to be mailed by United States mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Jeffery C. Peatross 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 ^ sf I 
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ADDENDA TO THE BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Request for an Additur or a New Trial 
Ruling granting additur 
Acceptance of Additur 




R. PHIL IVIE, #3657 
JEFFERY C. PEATROSS, #5221 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
(801) 375-3000 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 




WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an 
individual, and US WEST 
COMMUNICATIONS, dba MOUNTAIN 
STATES TELEPHONE AND 
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR AN 
ADDITUR OR A NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 910400402 
Judge George E. Ballif 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Coral Terry, by and through 
her attorney Jeffery C. Peatross, and requests Additur or in the 
alternative a new trial on the issue of damages pursuant to Rule 
59(a)(5) and (6), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
DATED AND SIGNED this 2J-—' " day of June, 1992. 
fEF^ERY C. PEATROSS 
IVIE & YOUNG 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Motion for Additur or a New Trial, with postage 
prepaid thereon this /^<^* day of June, 1992, to the following: 
Floyd A. Jensen 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
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*>r-*rr- •••' IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ft ft \ St 
********** 
< W V 
CORAL TERRY, 
Plaintiff, Case Number: 910400402 
vs. RULING 
GEORGE E. BALLIF, SENIOR JUDGE 
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, 
Defendant. 
********** 
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiff's motion 
for an additure or in the alternative, a new trial. 
The matter of liability was directed by the Court. The 
issue of causation of plaintiff's injury by the defendant was 
found by the jury and an award of $12,000.00 for specials and 
$5,000.0 general damages was made. 
The foregoing was based on the Court's instructions that 
on the finding of causation the jury was to assess damages for the 
full amount of plaintiff's injuries although the defendants 
negligence may have aggravated or light up a latent, dormant, or 
asymptomatic condition. 
In assessing such damages the jury awarded only little 
more than half the medical and other special damages testified to 
by the only witnesses on this point called by the plaintiff. 
The jurors assessment of general damages did not take 
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into account the pain and suffering of plaintiff to date, nor that 
attributable to the surgery, as testified to by Dr. Smith. 
Based on the foregoing considerations the Court grants 
the plaintiff's motion and directs that the sum of $15,000.00 be 
added to the judgment or if defendant refuses such additure, the 
Court grants a new trial of this matter. 
Dated thisZ-5 day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
BALLIF, /SR. JUDGE 
cc: R. Phil Ivie, Esq. 




FLOYD A. JENSEN, Bar #1672 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-7418 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OP UTAH 
# - — -fcrjuiy 
CORAL TERRY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an individual, 
and U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, 
dba MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
ACCEPTANCE OP ADDITUR 
Civil No. 910400402 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
Defendants William C. Bowles and U S WEST Communications, Inc. 
hereby accept the conditional additur ordered by the Court in its Ruling 
dated July 23, 1992, but reserve their right to appeal from the amended 
judgment that will be entered incorporating and reflecting such additur, and 
do not intend hereby to waive any such right of appeal. 
This election is made as a result of the order of the Utah Supreme 
Court dated October 13, 1992, which summarily dismissed Defendants' 
appeal from the original judgment on the grounds that the appeal was 
premature and that the Supreme Court therefore lacked jurisdiction. That 
ruling implied that the only means of obtaining appellate review of the order 
granting an additur is for Defendants to make an election between a new 
trial and an additur. Based on the Supreme Court's statement in State v. 
General Oil Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 448 R2d 718, 719 (1968) (aWe need not 
determine whether or not the court's ruling [granting] an additur was 
erroneous inasmuch as that issue has now become moot by the trial de 
novo."), Defendants believe that the Supreme Court might refuse to review 
the additur if Defendants elected a new trial; therefore, it appears that the 
only other alternative means of obtaining appellate review is by electing an 
additur and appealing from the amended judgment. 
Dated this c1 day of November, 1992. 
U S WEST Communications, Inc. 
By ^Z'\/\/€U, 
Floyd A. Jensen, Senior Counsel 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this ' day of November, 1992, I mailed, by 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing ACCEPTANCE 
OF ADDITUR to the following: 
Jeffery C. Peatross 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo, Utah 84603 
ADDENDUM D 
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FLOYD A. JENSEN, Bar #1672 
Attorney for Defendants 
250 Bell Plaza, 16th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 237-7418 
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JtfL .- r->: 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CORAL TERRY, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM C. BOWLES, an individual, 
and U S WEST COMMUNICATIONS, 
dba MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH 
COMPANY, j 
Defendants and Appellants. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON 
SPECIAL VERDICT, WITH 
ADDITUR 
Civil No. 910400402 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
The above entitled action having come before the Court for trial on the 26th, 
27th and 28th days of May, 1992. The plaintiff having been represented by JeflFery 
C. Peatross, IVIE & YOUNG, and defendants having been represented by Floyd 
Jensen, testimony having been taken and argument of counsel having been 
heard, the jury returned a special verdict as follows: 
a l . Was the negligence of defendant, Bowles, in the January 30, 1989, 
accident a proximate cause of plaintiff, Coral Terry's injuries? 
Yes _ X _ No 
a2. If your answer to the above question is yes, proceed to answer 
question number 3. If your answer is no, so indicate and sign and return this 
Special Verdict to the court. 
a3. What sum would fairly compensate plaintiff, Coral Terry, for the 
J * * i 
damages, if any, which she sustained as a result of the incident: 
aA. For special damages $ 12.000 
aB. For general damages $ 5.000" 
Based on the foregoing verdict, on June 12,1992, the Court (Ballif, J.) 
entered a Judgment on Special Verdict in the amount of "SEVENTEEN 
THOUSAND DOLLARS ($17,000) with interest to be included on special damages 
of $12,000 from the date of the loss until entry of judgment at the rate of 8% per 
annum, together with costs in the amount of $53Q.Q0 to assessed pursuant to 
Rule 54 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.* 
On July 23, 1992, pursuant to and granting Plaintiffs Request for an 
Additur or a New Trial, filed June 2, 1992, the Court (Ballif, Ret. J.) entered its 
ruling granting an additur in the amount of $15,000, or if Defendants refused 
such additur, a new trial. 
Defendants having timely filed their Acceptance of Additur dated November 
10, 1992, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters judgment in favor of 
Plaintiff and against Defendants in the amount of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND 
DOLLARS ($32,000) with interest to be included on special damages of $12,000 
from the date of the loss until entry of judgment at the rate of 8% per annum, 
together with costs in the amount of $ , to be assessed pursuant 
to Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. -
DATED AND SIGNED this J L _ day of llLte£AnJ& . 19 12. 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this J_ day of November, 1992,1 mailed, by 
United States Mail, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing AMENDED 
JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT, WITH ADDITUR to the following: 
Jeffery C. Peatross 
IVIE & YOUNG 
48 North University Avenue 
P.O. Box 672 
Provo,Utah 84603 
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